extrinsic denomination

[WORK IN PROGRESS, TBD]

Ross puts “common name” in parentheses after “extrinsic denomination” suggesting that he thinks of them as synonyms: “extrinsic denomination (common name).”

Elsewhere he repudiates the Medieval distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination:

“I put ‘non-constitutive relation’ in parentheses when describing denomination in general because I do not distinguish between what various medieval writers (and Locke) called ‘extrinsic‘ and ‘intrinsic‘ denomination.”

My best guess: Isn’t this because Ross would dispute the idea that it is possible to denominate a real nature intrinsically? There will always be overflow necessities, and so you will never be able to make a real thing fit in a conceptual box, and even those regularities which you do observe are  incomplete descriptions that will likely need to be amended over time as your acquaintance with the thing improves. In fact, Ross’s very definition of nature is “extrinsic” in that it is based on how a thing behaves, which means how it relates to other things. All denomination of real things is relational for Ross, and so all denomination is “extrinsic”. Only formal things can be denominated intrinsically.

Suarez held that nature is only communicable by extrinsic denomination.